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Crowdsourcing platforms were initially designed to recruit
people to perform tasks that were simple cognitively but diffi-
cult for computers. One challenge in these settings is to iden-
tify an incentive mechanism for motivating workers to com-
plete tasks and do high-quality work. Previous research has
studied the use of financial incentive mechanisms and social
comparison as motivators. These mechanisms can only be ap-
plied to ground truth tasks, tasks for which there is an objec-
tive performance scale. In this paper, we define and compare
three innovative methods for improving worker engagement
on non-ground truth tasks drawing on a psychological theory
of commitment. The three methods are similar in asking par-
ticipants to promise they will complete a task, but they differ
in terms of how the commitment is made. In the first method,
participants commit by signing a contract; in the second, by
listening to a recording; in the third, by recording a personal
commitment. The last two methods significantly improved
the task completion rate when compared to two baseline con-
ditions. The methods we propose can be implemented simply,
can be used for any task, and do not affect participants’ be-
havior other than by improving their engagement.
Introduction
Over the past decade there has been constant growth in
participation in online crowdsourcing platforms. One main
challenge all crowdsourcing platforms share is that of mo-
tivating participants. Some platforms (e.g., Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com/)) use finan-
cial compensation mechanisms for recruiting people. Other
platforms (e.g., Zooniverse (Borne and Team 2011)) use
people’s desire to contribute to science as a means of mo-
tivating them to carry out tasks that will further scientific
research (without offering them monetary compensation).
The lab in the wild platform (Reinecke and Gajos 2015)
relies on people’s curiosity to motivate them to participate
in the tasks. In this work, we introduce methods to im-
prove crowd engagement in tasks on financial-based plat-
forms. In these platforms, the use of “simple” extrinsic in-
centives to improve work quality (e.g., higher payment for
completing a task) is not sufficient (Yin and Chen 2015;
Radanovic and Faltings 2016; Singla and Krause 2013).
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The lack of commitment to doing high-quality work
on those platforms may be attributed to the absence of
a long-term relationship between workers and employers.
Financial-based crowdsourcing platforms do not encourage
or facilitate such long term relationships. In traditional la-
bor markets, where there is a long-term employee-employer
relationship, a “psychological contract” forms between the
two parties (Robinson 1996). This psychological contract in-
centivizes commitment and a willingness to engage in orga-
nizational citizenship behavior (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler
2000). In some crowdsourcing platforms, the lack of rela-
tionship between the employees and the employers puts the
employees in a state of constant tension. On one hand, the
employees know that their employer expects them to be fully
engaged in the task at hand - that is what they are being paid
for. On the other hand, employees attempt to maximize their
revenue which makes the dominant strategy to complete a
task as quickly as possible, resulting in low-quality results).
The main benefit for employers in using these platforms is
the large, diverse and stable pool of workers they offer. In ad-
dition, the compensation for completing a task is relatively
low compared to traditional labor markets.
Several approaches for enhancing worker engagement in
ground truth (GT)-based tasks (there is an objective perfor-
mance scale) have been studied. Some research examines
the use of financial compensation mechanisms which are
based on the workers’ performance (Yin and Chen 2015;
Mason and Watts 2010; Gao et al. 2012; Feng et al. 2014).
Another line of research suggests the use of intrinsic be-
havioral factors to motivate workers (Law et al. 2016;
Kaufmann et al. 2011).
Keeping workers motivated on tasks for which there is no
ground truth (no right or wrong answer) is even more diffi-
cult. For non-ground truth (NGT) tasks, the traditional “car-
rot and stick” approach cannot be applied because in situ-
ations in which there is no benchmark for work quality, it
is very difficult (and sometime impossible) to assess work
quality. Workers participating in this type of task are some-
times aware that there is no quality metric, which can affect
the way they carry it out. To illustrate this problem, imag-
ine a scenario where a company is interested in launching
a new website. To get feedback about the design and the
quality of interaction with the new website, the company
decides to use workers from an online labor market. The
workers are asked to share their personal experience, so they
know that the quality of their work is not measurable. They
are faced with the following dilemma: should they do the
right thing and invest the time to truly interact with the web-
page before supplying their answers, or should they simply
supply random answers and complete the task in less time.
Imposing compensation mechanisms based on the similarity
of one worker’s answer to that of another is dangerous be-
cause workers may not indicate their true preferences, and
instead attempt to list preferences they believe are common
to most of the workers. The use of crowdworkers for NGT
tasks is very common (Hossfeld et al. 2014; Loni et al. 2014;
Larson et al. 2014; Soleymani et al. 2012), it is therefore im-
portant to address the crowd engagement problem for NGT
tasks.
In this paper, we introduce three methods for improving
worker engagement in NGT tasks. The inspiration for our
methods came from the “commitment and consistency” the-
ory of Cialdini and Garde (Cialdini and Garde 1987). Ac-
cording to this theory, the desire for consistency is embed-
ded in human nature. Inconsistency is commonly thought
to be an undesirable personality trait. The desire for consis-
tency is external and internal: we desire to be perceived as
consistent human beings by society and by ourselves. Ac-
cording to this theory, the desire to be and to look consistent
is triggered when we commit to a certain action. When a
commitment is made, it is likely to be met even in situa-
tions where it does not align with one’s best interest. The
“commitment and consistency” theory introduces the effect
of commitment on people’s actions, but it does not suggest
what form of commitment is most effective.
In this paper, we compare the efficiency of three ways
crowdworkers may commit to doing their best in complet-
ing a task:
• “Commitment by signature”: The workers are required to
confirm they will complete the task exactly the way it is
stated in the task description by checking a box.
• “Commitment by listening”: The workers are required to
confirm they will complete the task exactly the way it is
stated in the task description by listening to a recording
stating that they will.
• “Commitment by speech”: The workers are required to
confirm they will complete the task exactly the way it is
stated in the task description by recording themselves stat-
ing they will.
The results reported in this paper indicate that the most ef-
fective forms of commitment are the commitment by speech
and the commitment by listening. As for commitment by
signature, the improvement was not statistically significant
when compared to two baseline conditions.
The main contribution of this work is two-fold:
• Proposing domain independent mechanisms (i.e., the
mechanisms do not involve any modification to the do-
main in which they apply) for improving crowd engage-
ment in NGT tasks and demonstrating the efficiency of
these mechanisms.
• Validating the non-desirable behavior of crowdworkers in
NGT tasks and demonstrating that this behavior is not due
to poor attention span.
Related Work
Crowdsourcing and Motivation
The past decade has seen significant growth in crowdsourc-
ing applications. There are two types of tasks in which
crowdsourcing is used. One type is the simple or inde-
pendent task. For example, labeling data for machine vi-
sion (Patterson and Hays 2012; Patterson et al. 2014; Raykar
et al. 2010) and natural language processing (Snow et al.
2008). The second type is the complex and higher-order cog-
nition task (Kittur et al. 2013). Much of the research dealing
with the second type of task has dealt with the question of
how to use decomposition techniques to break down a com-
plex task into independent and simple micro tasks (Bern-
stein et al. 2015; Bigham et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2014;
Kittur et al. 2011; Kittur et al. 2012; Kulkarni et al. 2011;
Lasecki et al. 2013; Little et al. 2010).
The crowdsourcing model, although novel in some im-
portant respects, retains a chalenge for labor marker re-
searchers key question that has captured the attention of re-
searchers: How to motivate workers and improve worker en-
gagement so they perform higher quality work. This chal-
lenge is of great importance, especially given the evidence
that some workers are primarily interested in producing
quick rather than quality labor in order to optimize their ef-
ficiency and, in turn, earn more money (Laws et al. 2011;
Akkaya et al. 2010).
Approaches to Motivating Crowdworkers
As the user motivation problem is very important for the
future of financial-based crowdsourcing platforms, various
methods have been proposed to address this problem. We
review three main approaches and explain the reasons they
are not applicable to NGT tasks. The first line of work sug-
gests using financial incentives to motivate workers (Ma-
son and Watts 2010; Kittur et al. 2008; Yin et al. 2014;
Liu and Chen 2016). Generously rewarding workers upon
completing a task was found inadequate in ensuring better
work quality. In fact, it has been shown that even at low com-
pensation rates, payment levels do not appear to affect work
quality but only the number of tasks workers complete (Ma-
son and Watts 2010). Moreover, it was shown that financial
incentives can be used to trade quality for speed (Mao et
al. 2013). The alternative to fixed payment upon completion
of a task is a reward based on performance. Different vari-
ants of performance-based incentives have been studied. In
one variant, workers are rewarded based on “relative per-
formance” (also known as “crowd-sourcing contests” (Gao
et al. 2012; Feng et al. 2014)). Namely, only the worker
who performed best receives a reward. In another variant,
workers are rewarded based on “absolute satisfying perfor-
mance”, i.e., based on pre-specified criteria (Ho et al. 2015).
According to this method, each worker who meets the pre-
specified criteria receives the reward regardless of the per-
formance of the other workers. These methods do not apply
to NGT tasks since performance cannot be measured.
The second line of work suggests the use of gold-standard
data to monitor work quality (Biewald 2011; Drapeau et
al. 2016). This approach uses fear of rejection to motivate
workers. The workers are told that the employer has the cor-
rect answers to some of the questions that appear in the task,
but the workers do not know which questions these are. In
addition, the workers are told that if they don’t answer these
particular questions correctly their entire work will be re-
jected and they will not get paid. This approach, although
promising, cannot be used in non-ground truth tasks since
there are no right or wrong answers. Therefore gold-standard
data cannot be embedded in the task.
The third line of work suggests that intrinsic motivations
such as enjoyment (Kaufmann et al. 2011), curiosity for new
knowledge (Law et al. 2016) or interest in contributing to a
certain scientific discipline (Mao et al. 2013) can incentivize
crowd-sourced workers. Although promising, for some tasks
such intrinsic motivational drivers are not feasible.
Motivating Crowd-Sourced Workers using Their
Peers
The research question this paper addresses —motivating
crowd-sourced workers in non-ground truth tasks, has been
investigated in the past. A peer prediction mechanism (or a
variant of this mechanism) has been suggested as a means to
address the worker motivation problem (Kamar and Horvitz
2012; Witkowski and Parkes 2012; Dasgupta and Ghosh
2013; Huang and Fu 2013b; Huang and Fu 2012). The gen-
eral idea behind this mechanism is that each task/question
is given to several workers, and the compensation for an-
swering the question is based on the number of workers who
gave the same answer. One problem with this mechanism is
that it may lead to consensus bias. The mechanism may en-
courage participants who know their opinion is of a minority
group to change their answer to one they believe is shared
by the majority group in order to maximize their compen-
sation. A Bayesian truth mechanism (Prelec 2004) was sug-
gested to address the consensus bias issue. The mechanism
requires workers to supply, along with their answer, a pre-
diction of the entire populations answers. There are several
limitations to deploying this method in crowdsourcing labor
markets. First, it requires workers to predict their peers an-
swers. In many tasks workers do not have this information.
Second, the underlying assumption of the mechanism is that
the players are utility maximizers. This assumption is prob-
lematic, since it has been shown in many domains that peo-
ple are rationally bounded (Simon 1982; Kahneman 2000;
Shin and Ariely 2004).
Using any form of monetary incentive for eliciting a
preference may result in participation bias. It has been
shown (Hsieh and Kocielnik 2016) that in online labor mar-
kets, monetary incentives affect the kind of workers who are
willing to take a job. In NGT tasks where it is important to
capture the preferences of the entire population, this bias is
likely to be unacceptable to employers.
An interesting line of research suggests the use of social
facilitation as a means of motivating crowd-sourced work-
ers (Huang and Fu 2013a). In this line of work, the labor
performed by workers is compared to the labor performed by
their peers; however the compensation for a certain worker
does not depend on the work performed by other workers.
The incentives in this case are social, therefore this method
is less likely to suffer from participation bias. Although
promising, this mechanism requires the overhead of pairing
together workers and asking them to share private informa-
tion about themselves.
Commitment and Consistency
The methods reported in this paper were inspired by com-
mitment and consistency theory (Cialdini and Garde 1987).
This theory has influenced disciplines besides marketing. In
one psychological experiment, (Schwartz et al. 2014) it was
shown that when the theory is applied properly it can pro-
mote positive health-related choices. In that study, partic-
ipants’ pre-commitment to a healthier life style (i.e., pur-
chasing healthier food) improved their choices. Another ex-
ample of the use of this theory is the “stickk” goal setting ap-
plication (http://www.stickk.com). The application
assists people in achieving their goals by asking them to set
goals and put some money aside, the money will be returned
to them only if the goals are achieved. People sign a contract
obligating them to achieve their personal goals. The creators
of this application stress that the commitment contract this
application offers is the key to its success.
Another relevant piece of psychological research deals
with “self-prophecy effect” (Greenwald et al. 1987; Sher-
man 1980). When people are asked to predict the proba-
bility that they will take a certain action, their behavior is
more likely to confirm that prediction. In one study, (Sher-
man 1980) participants who were asked to predict the likeli-
hood that they would contribute to a charity were more likely
to do so when given the opportunity than participants who
were not asked to predict their behavior. In another study,
(Greenwald et al. 1987) the proportion of participants who
answered “yes” when asked if they would vote in an up-
coming election, and went on to do so, exceeded the propor-
tion of participants who voted without being asked to predict
their behavior.
Experimental Infrastructure
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental work-flow. Participants
first got instructions, namely the task description which was
to check 20 images of artificial grass and indicate which one
looked most natural. Participants were instructed to check
all 20 images before deciding; this specific requirement was
highlighted. On the second, third and fourth steps of the ex-
periment, participants were required to record themselves,
listen to a recording and read one line of text. The content of
what they were required to record, listen to, and read varied
based on the experimental conditions. In the next section we
will describe the exact content in more detail. The fifth step
was the actual task, the artificial grass survey. On the final
step of the experiment, participants were required to supply
demographic information (gender, age and location).
Figure 2 shows an example of the actual grass survey task.
There were 20 links to web pages containing the artificial
grass images. Participants were required to select one an-
swer to complete the survey. The 20 links were in a text
format and not hyperlinks (e.g, clicking on the links would
not direct the worker to the web page where the image was
stored). We chose to use this design because a non-hyperlink
design ensures that if a web page is invoked the picture is
actually viewed, whereas in a hyperlink design it is possible
for a participant to invoke the 20 web pages without actually
viewing the images.
Figure 1: The experimental work-flow.
This task is a classic form of NGT task, as we ask the par-
ticipants to state their opinion. Therefore it is a good fit to
test our methods. In addition, this task does not require any
special expertise or outstanding ability on the part of partic-
ipants: the average person can complete this task exactly as
described in the task directions.
The Methods
in this section we introduce the methods that were used in
our experiments and explain how they were embedded in
the experiment flow:
• Commitment by speech: In the second step of the ex-
periment, participants were required to record themselves
saying: “I promise to complete the tasks exactly the way
stated in the task description.” To ensure that participants
Figure 2: Illustration of the survey task.
recorded the above sentence, they were told that their
work would be rejected if they failed to make the record-
ing. In the third step of the experiment, participants were
instructed to listen to a recording of a code and enter the
code into a text box (similar to capcha). We indicated that
this step was necessary to ensure they were not a robot. In
the fourth step, participants were informed that they were
about to begin the task and needed to check the box below
and click the continue button to move forward.
• Commitment by listening: In the second step of the ex-
periment, participants were required to record themselves
saying: “hello world.” Participants were told that their
work would be rejected if they failed to record the sen-
tence. We indicated that this step was necessary to ensure
they were not a robot. In the third step of the experiment,
participants were instructed to listen to a recording stat-
ing: “By clicking the agree button you promise to com-
plete the tasks exactly the way stated in the task descrip-
tion.” The recording ended with a code. Participants were
required to enter it into a text box and then click a but-
ton stating “I agree” in order to continue to the next step.
The fourth step was similar to the fourth step used in the
commitment by speech experiment.
• Commitment by signature: The second step of the exper-
iment was similar to the one used in the commitment by
listening experiment (saying hello world). The third step
was similar to the one used in the commitment by speech
experiment (listening to a code). In the fourth part of the
experiment, participants were presented with the follow-
ing sentence: “I promise to complete the tasks exactly the
way stated in the task description. To continue to the next
step, participants were required to check a box and click
a button stating “I agree.”
We compared participants behavior in these conditions to
two baseline experimental conditions:
• Baseline: The second step of the experiment was similar
to the one used in the commitment by listening experi-
ment (saying hello world). The third step of the experi-
ment was similar to the one used in the commitment by
speech experiment (listening to a code). The fourth step
was similar to the fourth step used in the commitment by
speech and commitment by listening experiments.
• Attention intervention: The second, third and fourth steps
of the experiment were similar to those used in the base-
line experiment. However, in this experiment, partici-
pants were not able to navigate between the fifth and the
sixth steps of the experiment without spending at least
three minutes on the actual task1. The attention inter-
vention method is commonly used for drawing attention
and awareness. The reason for using this intervention is
to demonstrate that the lack of engagement exhibited by
workers in our domain is not attributable to poor attention
span.
Table 1 summarizes, for each experimental condition, the
1Participants were presented with a timer, and the submit button
was only enabled when the timer reached zero.
Record Listen Sign
C by speech I promise to ... code continue to task
C by listening hello world I promise to ... continue to task
C by signature hello world code I promise to ...
Baseline hello world code continue to task
Attention int. hello world code continue to task
Table 1: Summary of each step of the experiment for the
different conditions.
exact requirements in the record, listen, and sign interven-
tions.
In several conditions, participants were required to record
themselves saying hello world, listen to a recording of a code
and check a box in order to continue to the sixth part of the
experiment. The reason for requesting these inputs from the
participants when they are obviously not a part of the treat-
ments was to avoid participation bias. If these requirements
were not included, the effect of the commitment methods
could have been attributed to the people participating in each
experiment (e.g., participants that are willing to record them-
selves are more engaged in the task). To avoid voice-related
biases, the voice of the recordings at the third step of the ex-
periment was generated by a computer (not human voice).
Platform & Participants
To test the proposed three methods, workers were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).2 We chose this
platform because we attempted to emulate a crowd-sourcing
scenario where an employer needs to recruit a large pool of
workers for a NGT task. We did not apply any screening
or qualification tests since the grass survey is not a com-
plicated task that requires workers with special capabilities.
Workers were paid 20 cents for their participation. To avoid
a carryover effect, a between subject design was used. We
recruited 5 groups of participants, each group had ∼ 50 par-
ticipants.3 Most of the participants in the different experi-
ment groups reported that they were located in the US and
were 21-40 years old. As for gender, there was no significant
difference4.
Measures
We consider a successful intervention one that improves
work quality. Measuring work quality can be achieved by
measuring the output/work that was produced, analyzing
workers behavior (e.g., task fingerprint) (Rzeszotarski and
Kittur 2011), or both (Rzeszotarski and Kittur 2012). In
NGT tasks, assessing the efficiency of an intervention is not
straightforward. We measured other factors that have an in-
direct effect on work quality. We argue that the most im-
portant factor affecting work quality is worker engagement
level. We use three measures to determine this factor in our
experiments:
2For a comparison between AMT and other recruitment meth-
ods see (Paolacci et al. 2010).
3We removed at most 3 participants from each group due to
their failure to record themselves.
4 For complete demographic information see Table 2.
• Commitment: One of the most basic and fundamental in-
dicators of workers engagement level is the way in which
workers follow the job description. Hence, the first (and
most important) measure we use is the binary measure
of whether a worker completed the task exactly as stated
in the task description. In our case, commitment means
whether or not a worker viewed all the images before de-
ciding which one to select. This measure by itself is not
sufficient since there is no consideration for the quality of
work; this measure only considers the fulfillment of the
minimal task requirement. In our experiments, a worker
who viewed all images but was not invested in the task
(e.g., just viewing the images briefly, and picking an im-
age randomly) would get a perfect score according to this
measure.
• Dedication: This measures the effort a worker puts to-
ward the task. In our case, it means the number of pic-
tures a worker viewed before making a decision. While
the first measure does not capture the difference be-
tween workers who are undedicated and workers who
are semi-dedicated, the second measure differentiates be-
tween these groups of workers. Again, this measure by
itself is not sufficient because viewing more images does
not necessarily mean exerting more effort.
• Time: This measure is used to validate the results obtained
by the other two measures. The time measure, in conjunc-
tion with the first two measures, presents a more holistic
picture of the workers’ engagement level. For each worker
we calculate the average time s/he spent viewing one im-
age: Task Completion TimeNumber of Images he/she Opened . The underlying assumption
is that more time a worker spent in viewing an image in-
dicates better work quality. We use this measure to verify
that quantity (i.e., number of images a worker views) does
not come at the expense of quality (the time a worker in-
vests in viewing the images). This measure by itself is not
sufficient since it does not consider the amount of work.
However the combination of the time put toward comple-
tion of the task and the amount of work done, indicates
worker engagement in the task as well as the quality of
the work itself.
Results
Figure 3 shows the effect of the different interventions over
workers’ commitment measure (the number of participants
completing the task). In the baseline condition (no inter-
vention), only 49% of the population viewed all 20 images
before deciding. Most of the participants did not complete
the task. As explained earlier, this percentage is an upper
bound for the number of participants who were actually
engaged in the task. In other words, out of the 49% that
completed the task, we cannot tell how many participants
were actually engaged in the task. This number could be
much smaller. When the commitment by speech and com-
mitment by listening interventions were used 70% of the
population completed the task. We used nominal logistic re-
gression with the commitment value (viewed all/some of
the images) as the dependent variable, the different meth-
ods (Baseline, Attention, Signature, Listening, speech) as
Figure 3: Percentage of population that completed the task
in each one of the interventions.
factor, and user information (gender, age, location) as co-
variates. After controlling for the gender, location and age
as covariates in a nominal logistics regeneration, the com-
mitment by speech (M=0.7, SD=0.46) and commitment by
listening (M=0.68, SD=0.47) interventions were found to
improve significantly participants’ commitment when com-
paring to the baseline condition. Commitment by speech
yielded chiSq(df=1)=4.07,p=0.04, and commitment by lis-
tening yielded chiSq(df=1)=5.57,p=0.018. As for the com-
mitment by signature intervention, while there is an im-
provement in the commitment measure when compared to
the baseline, this improvement is not statistically significant
chiSq(df=1)=0.04,p=0.83. Another interesting result shown
in the figure is that the attention intervention did not improve
commitment. This result is very surprising since this method
provides a constant reminder to workers of what is expected
from them, nevertheless their behavior did not change at all.
Figure 4 shows the extent to which workers completed
the task (the dedication measure). Each bar in the graph is
divided to three parts, the bottommost part represents the
percentage of the population that made their decision after
viewing less than 25% of the images (denoted ’Low’). The
middle and topmost parts represent the percentage of the
population that made their decision after 25%−75%, and at
least 75% of the images (denoted ’Medium’ and ’High’ re-
spectively). This graph complements Figure 3, and presents
in more detail the amount of effort invested by participants
for the different interventions. According to the commitment
measure in Figure 3, the effect of commitment by listen-
ing and commitment by speech interventions was similar.
However, Figure 4 reveals that the effect is not identical.
When the commitment by listening intervention was applied
74% of the population were highly dedicated to the task,
and when the commitment by speech intervention was ap-
plied 83% of the population were highly dedicated. This re-
sult indicates that there is a minor advantage for the speech
intervention over the listening intervention. In addition, the
dedication measure reveals that participants in the attention
intervention condition behaved differently from participants
in the baseline condition. This difference is not noticeable
Figure 4: Percentage of population and the quantity of im-
ages they viewed in each one of the interventions.
when considering just the commitment measure. The dif-
ference is not negligible, and it indicates that the attention
intervention may affect peoples’ behavior. In the baseline
condition 27% of the participants exhibited low dedication,
while in the attention intervention condition the percentage
was significantly lower (9%). In other words, the attention
intervention demonstrated ability to “push” a group of par-
ticipants who exhibited low task engagement level to a stage
were they are a little bit more engaged in the task.
We used logistic regression with the dedication value
(number of images viewed) as the dependent variable, the
different methods (Baseline, Attention, Signature, Listening,
speech) as factor, and user information (gender,age,location)
as covariates. After controlling for gender, location and
age as covariates in logistics regeneration, the commitment
by speech (M=17.1, SD=5.85) and commitment by lis-
tening (M=17.1, SD=5.4) interventions were found to im-
prove significantly participants’ commitment when compar-
ing to the baseline condition. commitment by speech yielded
F(1,88)=4.43,p=0.03 and commitment by listening yielded
F(1,92)=5.43,p=0.02. As for the commitment by signature
intervention (M=15.8,SD=6.4), while there is an improve-
ment in the dedication measure when compared to the base-
line (M=13.2, SD=8.2), this improvement is not statistically
significant F(1,92)=0.97,p=0.3.
Figure 5 presents the average time a worker invested in
examining one image (the time measure). In the figure,
for each experimental condition, the population of partic-
ipants is divided to three categories of dedication (similar
to the categories presented in Figure 4). As can be seen in
the figure, for 4 out of 5 conditions the average per image
viewing time invested by participants who exhibited low,
medium, and high dedication levels (different amount of im-
ages viewed), is similar. Since the average time participants
invested in viewing images had nothing to do with the num-
ber of images they viewed we are able to verify that quantity
does not come at the expense of quality, and therefore the
number of images participants view is a good measure for
work engagement.
The only discrepancy is in the attention intervention con-
Figure 5: Average time (in seconds) participants invested
watching each image.
dition. This discrepancy can be attributed to the nature of the
intervention, which is based on time. A possible explanation
could be that participants in this intervention viewed only a
small portion of the images and then stared at the screen and
waited for 3 minutes to pass so they would be able to click
the “end-task” button.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrated the effectiveness of making
a promise as a method for increasing worker engagement.
The methods we presented were inspired by “commitment
and consistency” theory. The innovation of this paper is in
taking this psychological effect and harnessing it toward the
improvement of work quality in crowdsourcing platforms.
In addition, to the best of our knowledge there is no previ-
ous literature discussing what form of commitment is most
effective. Through empirical investigation, we explored dif-
ferent forms of making commitment. Our results indicate
that the most effective forms were commitment by speech
and commitment by listening. This result is surprising be-
cause in traditional markets there is almost no value for an
unwritten promise, while there is a high value for a promise
made by a signature. The results presented in this work in-
dicate that there is a higher value (in terms of commitment)
for promises made by voice or by listening to a recording.
We cannot determine why commitment by speech and lis-
tening were better than commitment by signature, but we
hypothesize that the reason is the over use of signatures on-
line. We hypothesize that people are used to this kind of in-
teraction online and therefore do not consider it as a com-
mitment mechanism. To further investigate this hypothesis
more experiments are required.
In addition to presenting methods for improving worker
engagement, we consider what factors made our methods
work. The results from the attention intervention condition
experiment assist us in concluding that the reason is not a
result of attention related factors. Therefore, we hypothe-
size that the commitment action is the reason. Further ex-
periments are required to prove this hypothesis.
This paper is a continuation of line of work dedicated to
crowdwork quality improvement. The approach taken in this
paper can be applied to any task without affecting worker
preferences. This latter attribute is crucial to non-ground
truth tasks, where usually the employee attempts to capture
truthful preferences.
The approach taken in this work does not add a heavy
burden for workers. The workers are not required to per-
form a time consuming or high cognitive load task. These
two features are crucial to the success or failure of mecha-
nism adoption. A good example for the importance of these
two features can be the captcha mechanism for differenti-
ating between human and robots. This mechanism is widely
adopted by companies due to the minimal overhead and cog-
nitive load it poses over the human users and because it is
possible to apply the mechanism in any given platform.
The mechanism we offer in this work requires speakers
or microphone. These two physical devices are very com-
mon and accessible to online labor workers. We note that it
might be more difficult to recruit workers willing to record
themselves since it requires workers to submit personal in-
put which for some workers might be uncomfortable. In any
case, since there is no statistical difference between the com-
mitment by listening and commitment by speech interven-
tions, we recommend using the commitment by listening
mechanism.
While this paper offers a mechanism for NGT tasks, our
findings may be relevant to GT tasks. Although there are
already good mechanisms for motivating crowdworkers in
GT task, combining our method with the existing mecha-
nisms can further improve workers engagement. An obvious
continuation work would be to compare the efficiency of the
mechanisms presented in this paper with other mechanisms
that were proven to be efficient in ground truth tasks.
There are two limitations of this work. First, to generalize
our results to different domains, additional experimentations
are required. Second, we cannot predict how our approach
will affect people in the long run. It is possible that if our ap-
proach were to be adopted and widely used, crowd workers
would accommodate promising and that would affect their
commitment (i.e., the phenomenon exhibited in our experi-
ment may “fade” over time if workers are constantly asked
to promise.)
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Appendix
Baseline Signature Listen Speech Attention
Gender Male 62% 44% 60% 46% 50%Female 38% 56% 40% 54% 50%
Location
US 60% 70% 64% 57% 61%
India 12% 6% 16% 15% 28%
Other 28% 24% 20% 28% 11%
Age
0-20 2% 8% 6% 4% 9%
21-30 63% 46% 58% 43% 50%
31-40 29% 26% 20% 30% 33%
41-50 4% 12% 8% 15% 2%
51- above 2% 8% 8% 7% 7%
Table 2: Demographic information of the participants in our
experiments.
